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ABSTRACT This paper aims at developing a political and historical reconstruction of the 
period spanning from the late nineteenth century to the present. In particular, this work 
investigates the relationship between the Argentine State and workers’ unions and the 
impacts of that relationship in the establishment, consolidation and potential decline of 
the health coverage system administrated by unions, in Argentina called obras sociales. 
This work will also support the hypothesis that the financing obtained by union leaders 
through this health coverage system has been an efficient instrument for sustaining a 
centralized union model and has in some cases guaranteed the continued governance of 
both union leaders and different national governments.
KEY WORDS Health Services Administration; Labor Unions; State, Right to Health; 
Argentina.
RESUMEN El presente trabajo se propone realizar una reconstrucción histórico-política, 
cuyo período transita desde fines del siglo XIX hasta la actualidad, que indague sobre 
la relación entre el Estado argentino y los sindicatos y sus repercusiones en torno a la 
constitución, consolidación y potencial ocaso del sistema de prestación de atención 
médica a los trabajadores administrado por los sindicatos, denominado en Argentina 
como obras sociales. Asimismo, sostendrá la hipótesis de que el financiamiento obtenido 
por parte de las cúpulas sindicales a través de las obras sociales ha sido un instrumento 
eficaz para sostener un modelo sindical centralizado que garantizó, en ciertos casos, 
gobernabilidad no solo a las cúpulas sino también a los diferentes gobiernos nacionales.
PALABRAS CLAVES Administración de los Servicios de Salud; Sindicatos; Estado; 
Derecho a la Salud; Argentina.
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INTRODUCTION
Countless scientific and journalistic works 
have discussed the complex, heterogeneous, frag-
mentary and non-universal nature of the Argentine 
health system throughout its history (1-3). A key 
– although not exclusive (3) – factor to under-
standing this reality is the analysis of the estab-
lishment, consolidation and potential decline of 
the health coverage subsystem based on mutual 
associations and obras sociales [health coverage 
administered by unions].
This paper aims at developing a political and 
historical reconstruction of the subsystem of obras 
sociales in Argentina, taking into consideration 
the development of trade unionism in the country 
and its relation with the State and its worker base. 
This reconstruction is grounded on the following 
hypothesis: the development of the obras sociales 
has had a relation of co-implication with the devel-
opment of a centralized union model. In this sense, 
the establishment of a centralized union model 
was not the only essential factor in the creation 
of mutual associations and obras sociales. On the 
contrary, the union financing of this health system, 
obtained through paycheck deductions and worker 
contributions has, at times, also been vital in sup-
porting this centralized union model, which would 
guarantee the continued governance of both union 
leaders and different national governments.
In order to demonstrate the relation of co-
implication between the system of obras sociales 
and the “union model,” this work will explore the 
following ideas:
   The development of mutual associations in 
Argentina from the late nineteenth century to 
the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
their gradual reconfiguration according to em-
ployment sector (in line with the corresponding 
reconfiguration of union organization).
  The importance of trade unionism by em-
ployment sector in Perón’s rise to power and its 
influence on the agenda of social health policies 
during his administration. Because of the laws 
regulating mutual associations, these policies 
bolstered funding for the union administration.
  The definitive institutionalization of the system 
currently referred to as “obras sociales” and 
its relation with the strategy to strengthen the 
administrative structure of unions according to 
employment sector, which under the direction 
of union leaders, served as a retaining wall for 
social conflict in the period from Perón’s over-
thrown in 1955 to the 1976 coup d’état.
  The new pattern of capital accumulation ad-
opted during the last three decades and the sub-
sequent weakening of the figure of the worker, 
which has put in to crisis both the rationality of 
the centralized union model and the system of 
obras sociales (that have begun to lose ground 
to private health companies).
  Our conclusions. 
METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS
A qualitative methodology is used in this 
paper, based on the analysis of studies related to 
the development of the Argentine health system 
(paying particular attention to those studies that 
focus on the medical care system provided to 
workers and administered by unions, referred to 
as the subsystem of obras sociales), as well as 
those connected with the development of trade 
unionism in Argentina and its relation with the 
State and the worker base. The analysis of these 
texts is complemented with a study of legislative 
documents relevant to the institutionalization of 
mutual associations and obras sociales. Therefore, 
this paper analyzes the regulations emerging 
from the different amendments of the Argentine 
Constitution and laws passed by the National 
Congress as well as executive orders. 
The analysis has been divided into four pe-
riods. The first period refers to the development 
of mutual associations from their first appearances 
in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century to Perón’s arrival to the presidency in 
1945. The second period focuses on the consoli-
dation of the system of mutual associations during 
the first two Perón administrations, between 1945 
and 1955, and the tension related to the proposal 
of a State-centralized health system. The third 
period covers the period of Argentine institutional 
instability between1955 and 1983, characterized 
by successive military coups d’état and by the 
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consolidation of what Belmartino refers to as the 
“corporative pact” between unions and the corpo-
ration or body of medical doctors, which was later 
institutionalized in Act No.18610. The last period 
starts in 1983 and extends to the present, and has 
been characterized by a crisis in the logic of the 
subsystem of obras sociales and a change from cor-
porative logic to market logic. Taking into account 
the distinguishing aspects of each period, both re-
lated to the development of the health system and 
the development of trade unionism, this analytical 
division is considered to be justified.
THE IMMEDIATE PRECEDENT: MUTUAL 
ASSOCIATIONS
There is general agreement among histo-
rians, sociologists, jurists and political scientists 
dedicated to this topic in recognizing a first his-
torical period (from the mid-nineteenth century to 
the 1940s) whose primary characteristic has been 
the absence of a systematic state policy regarding 
health (3-8).
As a matter of fact, from the establishment 
of the Argentine State to the start of the twentieth 
century, health, as a concept, had a strictly in-
dividual connotation. Disease and its treatment 
were regarded as a subjective issue and its legal 
framework was expressed as a private contract 
between the patient and the physician. Although 
it is acknowledged that health was considered 
part of the “social question” by hygienists in the 
nineteenth century (9 p.102), this theoretical-
scientific approach did not seek to universalize 
what we today conceive as the “right to health,” 
but rather to prevent diseases or outbreaks that 
could spread throughout the entire social body 
(without distinction of social class) and halt the 
development of the country’s modernization. 
Under this paradigm, considerations on the 
matter by Sarmiento and Rawson can be found, 
as well as Emilio Coni’s theoretical proposals re-
garding public health and the establishment of 
the National Department of Hygiene in the year 
1880 (10 p.194).
In that context, the health of the citizens was 
not an item on the State’s agenda as a “gendarme” 
or “watchman” State. All that was of interest was 
the care of urban hygiene and prevention of out-
breaks (1 p.60). The meager public network of the 
budding “Argentine health system” was adminis-
tered by the different provincial and municipal 
jurisdictions and by the ladies of the Benefit 
Society [Sociedad de Beneficiencia], who, by 
using resources subsidized by the State itself, ran 
a number of public hospitals. Nonetheless, free 
access to the services provided by these publi-
cally funded institutions was only guaranteed to 
those declared “destitute” (3 p.31) by the com-
missioner or president of the auxiliary committee 
of parochial hygiene corresponding to the place 
of residence of the person affected.
Medical attention was a privately granted 
service, with the exception of people in conditions 
of extreme poverty; thus, health care began to be 
a concern of the working class. In that context 
of lack of coverage, “mutual aid associations” (or 
simply “mutuals”) were spontaneously created. 
They developed from a sort of “sui generis” orga-
nization (3 p.32) due to the collective nature of 
the coverage of medical costs, based in voluntary 
and/or regular contributions. These mutual as-
sociations basically originated in the European 
flows of immigration. This is evidenced by the 
types of mutual associations that were created: in 
some cases they were organized according to na-
tionality and, in some others, according to labor 
identification. The first type founded its inner het-
erogeneity based on a common national identity, 
and they succeeded in providing, in the most 
paradigmatic cases, hospital services for their af-
filiates (such as the Italian Hospital, the German 
Hospital, and the Spanish Hospital). The second 
type founded its inner heterogeneity according 
to trade (for instance, the mutual association of 
the train drivers’ union La Fraternidad); labor ac-
tivity performed (the mutual association of the 
Typography Union); company (the mutual asso-
ciation for railway workers which was supported 
by employer contributions); area or place of work 
(generally, in local unions for multiple trades 
with anarchist tendencies); socialist ideological 
inclination; or, in contrast, religious affiliation 
such as the Catholic Worker Circles [Círculos 
Católico de Obreros]. In general, mutual associa-
tions that were differentiated according to labor 
identity were not able to develop their own care 
centers. Rather, their main function was to cover 
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and finance the costs of the medical care mostly 
provided in private institutions (1 p.70).
As documented in the statistics gathered in 
1919 by the president of the National Department 
of Labor, Alejandro Unsain, the number of mutual 
associations increased exponentially from the 
last quarter of the 19th century to the first quarter 
of the 20th century. According to the census of 
1927, there were 1,141 mutual associations in 
the country, with 552,986 affiliates (1 p.67).
If we consider the weakening of anar-
chism as the organizing agent of a revolutionary 
working class movement and the consolidation 
of the “unionist” tendency (11), which started to 
organize unions according to labor activity, then 
we can confirm the hypothesis that mutual as-
sociations also largely reconfigured themselves 
according to labor activity. The cultural tradition 
of mutualisms mounted on the structure of union 
development in the country constitutes the im-
mediate precedent and, at the same time, a de-
termining factor for the later development of the 
subsystem we know today as “obras sociales” (3 
p.32).
However, the mutual associations’ coverage 
model of voluntary affiliation started to face a 
crisis as a consequence of the increase in costs 
caused by technological development that in-
troduced into the field of medicine greater spe-
cialization, equipment and drugs (3 p.72). The 
financing difficulties that mutual associations 
started to have, especially medium and small-
sized associations, led to the strengthening of the 
relation between these entities and the State.
Furthermore, the impact of the economic 
crisis of the year 1929 caused an increase in the 
number of users that, due to the lack of personal 
resources, resorted to public hospitals (3 p.81). 
Following these events, doctrinal and institutional 
debates on the function of the State regarding 
health issues and its capacity for intervention 
started to develop (3 p.107). The specialized 
bibliography recognizes that the regulatory pro-
posals of Peronism in the political system were 
immersed in a previous doctrinal debate that 
almost unanimously considered that the central-
ization of resources and medical services in the 
hands of the State would be more efficient.
TRADE UNIONISM AND THE HEALTH 
SYSTEM DURING THE FORMATION AND 
CONSOLODATION OF PERONISM
General consensus exists on the fact that, after 
the rise of Perón to the national government, there 
was a failed attempt to centralize the health system 
in state hands. The creation of the Secretariat of 
Public Heath [Secretaría de Salud Pública] (a) in 
1946, which depended on the vice-presidential 
office of Argentina, evidences this assertion. Firstly, 
establishing this secretariat as autonomous with 
respect to the Ministry of Home Affairs [Ministerio 
del Interior de la Nación] conferred a “ministerial 
status” to its bureaucratic decisions. Secondly, the 
appointment of Ramón Castillo as its senior member 
implied a prioritization within the state agenda of 
those measures the State would take regarding the 
“health question.” Taking this into consideration, it 
is evident that the State was affirming the idea that 
health was a public issue, a concept that had started 
taking shape in the country first with the hygienists 
and then with the financial crisis that affected the 
mutual associations; however, it acquired interna-
tional scope especially after the “Beveridge Plan” 
was published by the British government in 1942. 
As Arce explains, seeing health as an individual 
issue had already been widely problematized 
and the notion of “public health” had taken hold 
throughout the Western world as a result of the 
post-war international policy (1 p.106).
Nonetheless, the idea of a comprehensive 
health policy encountered serious difficulties, 
owing to factors both internal and external to 
the government, and which had their roots in 
Peronism itself. Thus, for diverse reasons, the 
Secretariat of Public Health was not able to 
carry out its “strategic plan of centralized ad-
ministration.” The specialized literature on this 
matter indicates two major reasons for this. On 
the one hand, the funding priority given to the 
Eva Perón Foundation [Fundación Eva Perón] 
that, according to Belmartino, followed electoral-
political criteria instead of the technical criteria 
advised by the Secretariat (3 p.116). On the other 
hand, the way in which the political support of 
Peronism itself was structured, sustained by the 
unions that had facilitated Peronism’s rise to 
power. The institutional participation that the 
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major unions organized by employment sector 
were starting to have in the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Welfare, and the growing legitimization 
that Perón acquired in this way eventually con-
ditioned a posteriori state health policies, once 
Perón took office as president. We will discuss 
this last point in more detail.
As the previous paragraph suggests, the fate 
of the health system, at least in terms of the grid 
related to the functioning of mutual associations, 
would be significantly affected by the subsequent 
development of the unions and their relation with 
the State. In order to analyze this hypothesis, an-
other issue connected with the development of 
trade unionism in Argentina should be discussed. 
In this case, we consider appropriate the classic 
work of Murmis and Portantiero found in Estudios 
sobre orígenes del peronismo (12). There, the au-
thors abandon the idea contained in the analyses 
of Gino Germani and the historical revisionism 
which considered that, despite their antagonistic 
conclusions, Peronism as a national and popular 
movement had its origin in “a new working class,” 
which had arrived in Buenos Aires as a conse-
quence of migration from the provinces. In con-
trast, Murmis and Portantiero consider that both 
the “new” and the “old” workers (those workers 
who had already lived and organized them-
selves in unions in Buenos Aires since the nine-
teenth century and who came from a culture of 
European immigration) found in Peronism a 
common “homogenizing” project (b). They con-
clude that the model of unions by employment 
sector, whose consolidation had been influenced 
first by the 9th Congress of the Argentine Regional 
Worker Federation (FORA) [Federación Obrera 
Regional Argentina] and, later, by the consti-
tution of the General Labor Confederation (CGT) 
[Confederación General del Trabajo] in 1930 (“the 
old union guard,” as Juan Carlos Torre would later 
name it), had been extremely important for the rise 
of Peronism to power and had a notable influence 
on decisions regarding social policies at that time 
(12). This can be easily verified by analyzing the 
way health resources were distributed and admin-
istered during the period from 1943 to 1955.
In this respect, prior to the creation of the 
Secretariat of Public Health and its later institutional 
transformation into the Ministry of Public Health 
(due to constitutional proclamation in 1949), the 
State had already been defining its relation with 
the unions with greatest negotiating power, which 
would be impossible to dissolve in order to favor 
a centralized health system. In fact, following the 
1943 coup d’état, the National Office of Public 
Health and Social Assistance [Dirección Nacional 
de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social] was created 
in October of that same year, which depended on 
the Ministry of Home Affairs. Various entities pre-
viously dispersed were gathered in this Ministry 
in an effort to centralize administration (3 p.110). 
This centralization, however, did not last long, as 
in August 1944 the functions of social assistance 
were delegated to the Secretariat of Labor and 
Social Welfare [Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión], 
created in 1943 to replace the National Department 
of Labor [Departamento Nacional del Trabajo].
From that moment onwards, the Secretariat 
began to have increasingly more functions related 
both to work and social security, workers’ health 
included. Thus, debates and disputes among the 
involved social actors took place in the Secretariat, 
which eventually regulated, for example, the 
medical profession by means of the Executive 
Order no. 22212/45 (13), still in force, and the 
constitution and administration of mutual associa-
tions (Executive Order no. 24499/45) (14) (c).
When considering the political importance 
that the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare 
acquired in the configuration of Perón’s political 
image, it seems plausible to assert that the nego-
tiations which took place there characterized the 
State’s subsequent decisions regarding social, and 
specifically, health matters. Indeed, from then on-
wards, a heterogeneity in health administration 
would be deepened by giving legal-institutional 
recognition and new funding possibilities (com-
pulsory contributions and state subsidies) to 
mutual associations. 
Clearly, in order to obtain those advantages, 
it was essential for unions not only to adopt po-
sition of being open to dialogue with the State 
(mutual associations that were not recognized by 
the State were implicitly prohibited, according to 
Section 98, Executive Order No. 24499/45) (d) 
but also to have bargaining power. The case of 
Railway Union [Unión Ferroviaria] serves as an 
example to illustrate this point. The General Office 
of Assistance and Social Welfare for Railway 
Workers (DGF) [Dirección General de Asistencia 
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y Previsión Social para Ferroviarios], created by 
Executive Order no. 168/44, was the first legal 
acknowledgement of a union health fund and it 
occurred in the context of the Secretariat of Labor 
and Social Welfare. This regulation established 
the obligatory nature of worker contributions 
(15 p.80) and of employer contributions, as well 
as health coverage for the direct beneficiaries 
(railway workers) and their immediate relatives 
(15 p.80). This is a clear example of how the so-
called “old union guard” had influence, not only 
in supporting Perón, but also in his government’s 
decisions regarding health.
Thus, this norm would be the initial step for 
the establishment of countless general offices of 
social assistance and welfare according to em-
ployment sector. From that moment onwards, the 
State would expressly participate (e) in the regu-
lation of the health system, but as we saw, it would 
no longer insist solely on a centralized model. 
Legislation on mutual associations established the 
obligatory nature of contributions, conferred the 
right to subsidies and set up auditing obligations (3 
p.123), which resembles much more the present 
concept of “obras sociales.” This development 
would cause three major consequences. First, it 
deepened the heterogeneity of the administration 
and distribution of health resources (independent 
of the work of Carillo’s administration). Second, 
the obligatory nature of contributions strengthened 
an extremely important funding source for the 
bureaucratic-administrative growth of the most in-
fluential unions organized by employment sector 
(in some cases, they created their own hospitals). 
Lastly, it consolidated the institutionalization of a 
health system based on the figure of the worker 
and on worker contributions (this was to such an 
extent that the Argentine Constitution enacted in 
1949 and Section 14 bis of the 1957 Constitution 
included the right to health as part of labor rights).
THE PRECURSOR TO THE OBRAS 
SOCIALES ACT
The deposition of the Peronist government 
would cause political and institutional instabilities 
that would develop without interruption until the 
democratic consolidation of 1983. According to 
O’Donnell, during this period the State’s role as 
center of decision-making weakened and private 
and corporate interests gained ground (16). With 
regards to the health system in particular, the spe-
cialized literature acknowledges that the period 
from 1955 to 1970 was characterized by a pro-
gressive disassembling of any traces of the cen-
trality established by Carrillo’s administration and 
by the influential impact of Peronist unionism and 
the corporation of doctors. 
After Perón was overthrown, the brief de 
facto governments of Lonardi and Aramburu had 
a common aim: public spending reduction and 
administrative decentralization. In this sense, it 
was considered that, on the one hand, it was nec-
essary to rationalize the budgetary deficit of the 
State and that, on the other hand, it was necessary 
to “de-Peronize” government administration (that 
is, to revert administrative centrality concentrated 
in national public entities since it was identified 
with fascist tendencies) (8 p.549). This reality 
converged with an equally important variable: 
Peronist union resistance during the period re-
ferred to as the Liberating Revolution [Revolución 
Libertadora] (17). Regardless of the proscriptive 
measures against Peronism – regarding political 
parties and unions and symbolically in general – 
the resistance process, more or less homogeneous 
(until that moment, at least) among Peronist union 
leaders and their worker bases, not only implied 
the subsistence of Peronism as a political ten-
dency (represented in worker corporations), but 
also the persistence of trade unionism as an im-
portant actor in the political system. In fact, during 
Perón’s exile, trade unionism acted as an opposing 
force against government measures and as a de-
cisive influence for both the electoral victory of a 
candidate (as in Frondizi’s rise to office) and the 
overturning of a government (as in the strategy 
of unity between unions and military officers to 
depose Illia) (17).
Considering this context, we can understand 
the reason for the progressive weakening of the 
public subsystem and the simultaneous expansion 
of obras sociales up to the 1970s. For the govern-
ments of the Liberating Revolution, continuing 
with the public health centralization policies 
would imply the continuation of high public 
spending at a national scale, which would be dif-
ficult to sustain and would mean being exposed 
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to increasing distrust on the part of conservative 
and anti-Peronist sectors. On the other hand, pre-
venting the development of the system based on 
obras sociales would imply further accentuating 
the differences with Peronist unionism and, as a 
consequence, abandoning all expectation of inte-
grating Peronist unionism into their political ob-
jectives. From the union leaders’ point of view, 
losing mutual association funding would mean 
the loss of their main source of funds and, on the 
other hand, in the context of public health services 
reductions, such lack of funding would worsen the 
growing difficulties union leaders faced in con-
trolling their worker bases (the root of what was 
called “Peronist resistance”) (17). This implied 
that, from the mid-50s onwards, the obras sociales 
expanded more and more. However, this growth 
no longer meant the building of each union’s own 
health facilities, as the largest unions did during 
Perón’s administrations, but to become a financial 
pool for funding services provided by private en-
tities (which had also expanded greatly during that 
period) (3 p.130).
This relation between the State and the 
unions, which was mainly based on conflict and 
resistance, would change with Frondizi’s arrival to 
office (due to the electoral support of Peronism pro-
vided by the unions). Frondizi honored his pact to 
pass the new Professional Worker Associations Act 
No. 14455 (18) that restored Peronist regulations 
regarding unions, given that Executive Order No. 
23852/45 had been abrogated by Aramburu. This 
new regulation once again centralized the union 
movement and gave significant powers to union 
leaders. If, as James argues, we also consider the 
failures of the strikes of 1959 and 1960 (against 
the implementation of the production rational-
ization plan proposed by the developmentalist 
government and companies) that demobilized the 
worker bases as a cause of their increasing lack 
of motivation (17 p.208), it is easy to understand 
the progressive process of bureaucratization of the 
union leadership during those years - an example 
of this is the emergence of “Vandorism” [a po-
litical movement associated with Augusto Timoteo 
Vandor, which proposed the idea of a “Peronism 
without Perón”]. From that point onwards, the le-
gitimacy of the union leaders would be based on 
the concessions and services (17 p.229) granted 
to the affiliates they represented, since they would 
no longer have active participation in the heart 
of union activity. In order to fund all those ser-
vices, the new Professional Worker Associations 
Act established the obligatory nature of employer 
withholdings for union dues and of “collective 
contributions” (f). However, also of great impor-
tance were the withholdings and contributions 
for obras sociales. It is estimated that, by 1964, 
60% of the total amount of funds administered by 
unions came from worker contributions; within 
this category, 33% of the toal came from payments 
towards the obras sociales. The remaining 40% 
came from employer contributions (17 p.228). In 
other words, the funds obtained for health cov-
erage programs in those years were greater than 
those obtained from affiliate dues.
Another relevant issue was that, following 
the fall of Perón, the corporation of doctors was 
reunified; up to then it had been divided into 
those who supported the idea of “public health” 
based on state administration (Carrillo’s legacy), 
and those who saw state centralization as a limit 
to the freedom of contract as professionals. The 
abandonment of the idea of “state centralism” after 
Carrillo’s attempt and the gradual consolidation of 
the system based on obras sociales implied the 
reunification of health professionals according 
to their exclusive interest as a body. From that 
point onwards, the influence of the corporation 
of doctors as a consolidated social actor would 
be crucial in affecting the State agenda. In the in-
teraction among the corporations of workers and 
doctors in the State sphere, the Obras Sociales Act 
No. 18610 (19) would start to take shape, which 
Belmartino identifies as the product of a “corpo-
rative pact” (3).
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE 
OBRAS SOCIALES: THE SANCTION 
OF ACT NO. 18610 
Once Illia was removed from presidential 
office by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
Juan Carlos Onganía (g), who acted in complicity 
with Peronist unions, the union leaders sought to 
once again institutionalize their privileged position 
as representatives of the working class before the 
State (Onganía fulfilled his part of the agreement by 
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abrogating Executive Order No. 969/66 signed by 
Illia, which liberalized and decentralized unions). 
However, the trust union leaders placed in their 
future relation with the de facto government at the 
time would enter into crisis after the new adminis-
tration’s first economic measures were taken. The 
program of the new Minister of Economy, Adalbelt 
Krieger Vasena, consisted of strict limits on wage 
raises through the suspension of collective bar-
gaining negotiations. On March 1, 1967, the first 
strike initiated by the CGT took place. The gov-
ernment responded with repression, the removal 
of the legal personality of certain unions and the 
reimplementation of the Executive Order No. 
969/66 (17 p.921). 
This situation would put Peronist unionism 
in a predicament, navigating between State sup-
pression, on the one hand, and losing legitimacy 
before its worker bases, on the other (17 p.292). 
The dilemma affected the institutionality of the 
CGT itself: in March 1968, the CGT split in two: 
“CGT of the Argentines” and “CGT Azopardo.” 
The first was headed by Raimundo Ongaro and 
took a position of direct opposition to the new 
government. The second, which included the 
Vandorist wing, had a more cautious position 
open to dialogue with the government. 
The persistent government measures that 
implied the loss of workers’ rights had begun to 
fuel social unrest. Indeed, a series of demonstra-
tions occurred in 1968 and 1969, the greatest 
expression of which was the “Cordobazo” [a civil 
uprising that originated out of a general strike in 
the city of Córdoba in 1969]. The new grassroots 
activists protested not only against corporations 
and the State, but also against union leaders. It is 
considered that these conflicts were motivated by 
two factos: on the one hand, by the geographical 
characteristics of certain industrial neighborhoods 
in the provinces (where association among people 
was facilitated by their close vicinity) and, on 
the other hand, by the actions of the new multi-
national companies that, starting in the 1950s, 
requested in exchange for their settling into the 
country that state entities confer union person-
ality to new unions at the company level (or by 
trade) with which they would be able to negotiate 
directly (this was reinforced by legislation that 
sought to decentralize the workers’ movement, 
such as the already mentioned Executive Order 
No. 969/66). The presence in the industrial plants 
of relatively small unions with little institutional 
activity made it so that union leaders failed to re-
strain internal opposition from among the workers 
(17 p.301). In this respect, these unions were not 
able to prevent the emergence of workplace del-
egates and the development of combative demon-
strations. Class unionism started to develop in this 
context, with Agustín Tosco as its most recognized 
representative. 
With its initial strategy interrupted, the State 
found in the traditional union leaders the answer 
for curbing the increasing social conflict. Thus, 
one year after the Cordobazo, and with Onganía 
on his way out, the Obras Sociales Act No. 18610 
(19) and the Executive Order No. 2477/70 (20) 
were passed, which restored the old union model 
established by Perón. The objective was to re-
centralize the workers’ movement and provide 
funding in order to placate worker activism.
The strategy can be confirmed merely by ob-
serving the development of the new Obras Sociales 
Act within the State structure. The draft legislation 
had its origins in the Ministry of Social Welfare 
[Ministerio de Bienestar Social], a ministry which 
contained little internal homogeneity (at least in 
terms of the planning of public policies). On the 
one hand, an initiative to strengthen the public 
health system began to be promoted by Ezequiel 
Holmberg in the Secretariat of Public Health. 
Holmberg’s intention was to adapt the national 
health system to the requirements of the Pan-
American Health Organization (PAHO) and the 
World Health Organization (WHO). On the other 
hand was the Secretariat of Promotion and Attention 
to the Community (SPAC) [Secretaría de Promoción 
y Asistencia a la Comunidad] under the direction of 
Santiago de Estrada. It is generally recognized that 
De Estrada supported the ideals of the “social doc-
trine of the Catholic Church,” which rejects techno-
cratic ideas and gives the State a subsidiary role in 
defining interests. According to some authors, this 
fact motivated his position of being “open to dia-
logue” with the corporations of workers and doctors 
(1). However, from our point of view, this tendency 
within the Ministry of Social Welfare was a con-
sequence of the socioeconomic situation of the 
time described previously. Indeed, it was the draft 
legislation introduced by the SPAC that prevailed, 
and to do so, it had the support and approval (g) of 
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the Minister of Social Welfare at that time, Carlos 
Consigli, who had been appointed after the minis-
terial crisis that followed the Cordobazo (3 p.167).
If we take into consideration the objections 
that Holmberg’s draft received from union leaders 
and the corporation of doctors (which considered 
any “nationalization” attempt as contrary to their 
right to contract), it is reasonable to think that 
the new Act No. 18610 (19) was a product of 
the pressure exerted by these groups. In short, 
as Belmertino argues, the State found itself to be 
incapable of imposing general rules; therefore, in 
order to sustain governability, it was forced to carry 
out “corporative pacts” (3 p.164). In this social 
context, it would have been a serious mistake to 
remove the care services that union organizations 
provided to their affiliates. The ideologists of the 
“Argentine Revolution” understood too late what 
Frondizi had astutely perceived: social manifesta-
tions carried out as a response to unpopular gov-
ernment measures had to be controlled through a 
pact with the Peronist union leaders, which meant 
strengthening the union leaders’ administrations 
(by granting them legal powers and a large fi-
nancial capacity). The new Peronist administration 
also understood this fact and, in 1973, passed Act 
No. 20615 (22), which exacerbated the power of 
the leaders of union federations, in a context of 
manifestations of the extreme Peronist left.
Onganía’s Executive Order No. 2477/70 
(20) established once again the legality of larger 
unions and federations organized by employment 
sector and, at the same time, by means of the new 
Obras Sociales Act No. 18610 (19), the financing 
to strengthen them would increase. In effect, this 
new legislation established that, for those unions 
with “union personality,” the creation of obras 
sociales for their members was compulsory, as 
were the contributions of all workers in that em-
ployment sector.
The “corporative logic” of the new Obras 
Sociales Act, with the idea of creating a larger 
margin of governability, would become glaringly 
apparent after the creation of the National Institute 
of Obras Sociales (INOS) [Instituto Nacional de 
Obras Sociales] as the center of corporative nego-
tiation (indeed, in 1971, the INOS was transferred 
to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor). The 
creation of a National Joint Commission [Comisión 
Paritaria Nacional] would further evidence that 
“logic” through the sanction of the Obras Sociales 
and Social Services Act No. 19710 [Ley 19710 de 
Obras y Servicios Sociales] (23), which created a 
body where agreements on costs would take place 
between medical and worker organizations (24 
p.3360). That “corporative logic” would be re-
flected from then onwards as the manifestation of 
the correlation of forces, through the obstruction 
of any other different regulatory attempt. Examples 
of this are the resistance to the so-called “Liotta 
Draft ” [Proyecto Liotta] (h), in 1973, and to the 
State’s overhaul of the obras sociales by the mil-
itary dictatorship through Acts no. 22269 in 1980 
(26) (i). 
OBRAS SOCIALES ACT NO. 23660 
OF 1989 AND ITS SUBSEQUENT 
AMENDMENTS: FROM “CORPORATIVE 
LOGIC” TO “MARKET LOGIC” 
In the year 1983, a candidate of the Radical 
Civic Union Party for the first time won the elec-
tions without Peronism being proscribed. Despite 
the slight electoral advantage over Peronism, 
Ricardo Alfonsín’s administration was strongly 
motivated to introduce certain substantial reforms 
(28 p.289). Those reforms would have two primary 
aims: to end the violent relationship between the 
State and civil society, on the one hand, and to 
strengthen democratic-representative institutions 
over relations among corporative groups, on the 
other hand (28 p.287). For this reason, the Radical 
party made two fruitless attempts to modify the 
union situation and the autonomy of the obras so-
ciales through new legislation. 
This intention was reflected in the so-
called “Mucci law,” which was introduced by 
the Executive Branch in 1983 and intended to 
guarantee a greater internal democratization of 
unions, and in the “Neri draft,” introduced by the 
Executive Branch in 1984, which sought to unify 
the financing of the health system in the hands of 
the State (without detriment to the persisting de-
centralized administrations) and establish more 
controls over the administration of the union’s 
obras sociales. Both attempts at regulation failed, 
and the opposition of union leaders is acknowl-
edged as the primary cause for this fact. From then 
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onwards, once the weakness of the government 
in this respect was demonstrated, Alfonsin’s ad-
ministration had to adopt a conciliatory attitude 
towards Peronist unions. Furthermore, the fall in 
real wages after the implementation of the “Austral 
Plan” [Plan Austral] in the year 1986 increased the 
number of general strikes and ended in the elec-
toral defeat of 1987, in the hands of a Peronism 
tenaciously supported by trade unionism.
This new situation and the restoration of 
certain government positions to Peronism (j) led 
health system legislation to follow the course of 
the “corporative pact,” institutionally established 
in the year 1970. Thus, in 1988, after the Union 
Associations Act No. 23551 (29) (still in effect 
today) was officially passed, which restructured 
the old centralized union model, the Radical 
party had to support the sanction of the Obras 
Sociales Act no. 23660 (30) (also still in effect) 
the following year, which essentially reestablished 
the health system prevailing in Act No. 18610 of 
1970 (3 p.175). The success of trade unionism 
reflected the progressive decline of Alfonsín’s ad-
ministration, whose anticipated fall came in 1989 
with the rise of a new Peronist candidate to gov-
ernment. However, this new administration would 
not necessarily imply that trade unionism would 
maintain its historic integration with the political 
system as a determining factor in government de-
cisions (despite its identification with the party), 
but, as it will be later discussed, would have a 
much more subordinated integration.
What is usually referred to as the “crisis of 
trade unionism” – in general associated to the end 
of the 1980s and the whole of the 1990s – was 
precipitated in Argentina by two fundamental 
reasons: the legacy of the extermination of grass-
roots union activists during the last military dic-
tatorship (31) and the change in the pattern of 
capital accumulation, based on financial activity 
and a sharp decrease in levels of employment. 
On the one hand, this evolved into a greater au-
tonomy of the union leaders in relation to the 
worker bases and, on the other hand, into a weak-
ening of their influence as a corporative actor in 
the political system. In addition, after the rise of 
Carlos Menem to power, Peronist unionism had to 
face another dilemma: the crisis of its party identi-
fication given a Peronist government that did not 
base its policies in social improvement. In this 
context, according to Murillo, the lack of indus-
trial resources (produced by a limited capability to 
mobilize its worker base) and of political resources 
(produced by this new Peronism) meant a turning 
point in the strategies of unions that, from then on, 
were focused on “organizational survival” based 
on obtaining financial resources (32 p.433). The 
defeat in the field of labor regulation during those 
years is understood as the compensation for the 
increase of resources that leaders would obtain 
to finance their social services. In this sense, a 
number of unions started to participate as share-
holders in the privatizations of state companies, or 
as shareholders in Retirement and Pension Funds 
Administrators (AFJP) [Adminstradoras de Fondos 
de Jubilaciones y Pensiones], among other ben-
efits that made this new union strategy come be 
called “entrepreneur unionism.”
It may be interpreted, firstly, that Menemism 
understood that transforming the State and the 
market without the support of union leaders 
would be impossible (notwithstanding their party 
identification), and secondly, that union leaders 
accepted their decline as an influential actor in the 
political system but assumed that they could avoid 
losing legitimacy as a result of the labor reforms 
through greater funding for social services for their 
affiliates. This would imply that the government 
not take part in the regulation of union associa-
tions and play a less decisive role in reforms for 
the obras sociales. It also implied that unions 
would accept the reforms of labor flexibilization 
but recurrently oppose the “reorganizing” of the 
system of obras sociales.
In fact, the CGT organized its only general 
strike during this period in 1992, when the gov-
ernment attempted to liberalize the competition 
between obras sociales and prepaid health care 
companies (32 p.430) (which culminated in 
the Executive Order No. 9/93 that established 
competition only among the obras sociales). 
Additionally, in the year 1994 the CGT threatened 
to call another general strike when the government 
arranged to enforce a reduction in employer’s con-
tributions to obras sociales (32 p.431).
However, despite the unions’ defense of the 
system of obras sociales, it was possible to modify 
their legal norms due to a structural problem: 
the crisis in the contributory systems of social se-
curity given the change in the pattern of capital 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND WORKERS’ UNIONS AND ITS IMPACTS IN THE UNION-BASED HEALTH COVERAGE REGIME 311
SA
LU
D
 C
O
LEC
TIV
A
, Buenos A
ires, 9(3):301-315, Septem
ber - D
ecem
ber, 2013
Universidad Nacional de Lanús | Salud Colectiva | ISSN 1669-2381 | ISSN 1851-8265
accumulation adopted following the 1976 coup 
d’état. The increase in unemployment, new forms 
of labor contracting, and unregistered employment 
added to the increase in medical care costs caused 
by the hyperinflation process, produced massive 
debts for the obras sociales. This situation limited 
their capacity to resist, which resulted in a loan 
granted by the World Bank to the obras sociales, in 
exchange for their acceptance of the process of re-
organization of the system – particularly, it was re-
quired that they support the resolutions of the Health 
Services Superintendency) [Superintendencia de 
Servicios de Salud]  (3 p.209).
Thus, despite the resistance of trade unionists 
to the enforcement of Executive Order No. 9/93 
(33), after the sanction of Resolution No. 633/96 by 
the Superintendency (34), the so-called “freedom of 
choice” among obras sociales began to be imple-
mented. In the ceaseless effort to obtain sources 
of funding, a number of union leaders attempted 
to adapt to the new context by understanding that 
the income growth due to obras sociales should 
be materialized in market competition with other 
obras sociales. Paradoxically, the primary strategy 
to draw new affiliates focused on arranging agree-
ments with prepaid health care companies to offer 
“superior plans” (k). Therefore the transfer of af-
filiates mostly occurred in the sectors of greater 
purchasing power in search of services provided by 
a specific prepaid health care company veiled by 
a union’s obra social (l). Thus, due to the transfer 
of affiliates from the contributory subsystem based 
on employment sector to the private subsystem of 
prepaid coverage, the lack of funding for the obras 
sociales increased and their (intra-class) solidarity 
function diminished as they assumed that of mere 
intermediaries between the affiliate and the prepaid 
health care company. The struggle for the compet-
itive gaining of resources, on the part of the union 
obras sociales, is currently visible in the accusations 
of lack of proper procedure and fraud in the dis-
tribution of funds by the Administration of Special 
Programs (APE) [Administración de Programas 
Especiales]. Evidently, given the financing crisis, 
obtaining greater portions of funds from the APE 
would be of vital importance in order to preserve 
the administration of the totality of union services.
In this sense, according to Belmartino, the 
1990s seems to have broken the traditional “cor-
porative pact” expressed in Act No.18610, going 
progressively from a health system originated ac-
cording to the logic of political-corporative bar-
gaining to a health system originated in market 
logic (3). The new Prepaid Health Care Act No. 
26682 (35) [Ley 26682 de Medicina Prepaga] 
of 2011 seems to be the institutional acknowl-
edgment of a health system that breaks with the 
function of (intra-class) solidarity and individu-
alizes legal relations in health (4).
CONCLUSIONS
At this point it is difficult to draw general con-
clusions, as the historical process described is highly 
volatile and complex. However, we would like to 
suggest some considerations and possible lines for 
future research related to the formulated hypotheses.
Firstly, we believe that the system of obras 
sociales has a strong cultural enclave that is 
even prior to the establishment of the Peronist 
movement. However, it is acknowledged that the 
configuration of trade unionism according to em-
ployment sector, which later supported Perón in 
his rise to power and which subsisted regardless 
of the absence of this leader, has been a highly 
important social actor for the creation of what is 
named by Belmartino as the “corporative pact.”
Secondly, we believe that strong reasons exist 
to consider that the different governments which 
achieved stability and governability had to develop 
close ties with union leaders to control social con-
flict. For this purpose, not only has the centralized 
regulation of union organization been crucial, but 
so has been the preservation of the system of obras 
sociales. Thus, union leaders would receive large 
amounts of money that facilitated granting conces-
sions to those they represented and financing their 
electoral campaigns for union office. The govern-
ments that were able to draft their strategies in con-
junction with union leaders found relative levels 
of success in the implementation of their policies. 
However, the governments that confronted unions 
not only faced the opposition of union leaders but 
also greater levels of conflict carried out by the 
worker bases. If the first and the second conclu-
sions are accepted, it can be understood why we 
have decided to call the relation between unions 
and obras sociales one of co-implication. In this 
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sense, each institution has mutually participated 
in strengthening the other.
Thirdly, the obras sociales system has created 
an essentially contributory health system based 
on the figure of the worker, which is currently in 
crisis. This can be noted in the progressive lack of 
funding for the obras sociales and the weak op-
position that unionism was able to initiate against 
the market attack from the 1990s to the present.
Lastly, the emergence of “market logic” in re-
placement of “corporative logic” has not mitigated 
the levels of fragmentation but, on the contrary, 
has exacerbated them. Not only have the bonds of 
intra-class solidarity been broken, but the health 
system has been restored to its original conceptu-
alizations based on the individual. The citizenship 
rights that during the “corporative pact” seemed 
to have been based on the identity of worker are 
today transferred to the identity of consumer (36), 
which further erodes the right to health under-
stood in egalitarian terms. 
ENDNOTES
a. The Secretariat replaced the previously men-
tioned National Hygiene Department.
b. According to these authors (12), this is a conse-
quence of the great industrialization process that 
began in the 1930s, the increase in levels of ex-
ploitation, and little openness in political channels. 
c. Regarding this point, the Executive Order no. 
24499, passed on October 6, 1945, created the 
Mutual Associations Office [Dirección de Mutuali-
dades], which would depend on the Secretariat of 
Labor and Social Welfare. In the aforementioned 
executive order, the State acknowledged the his-
torical importance of mutual associations and 
proposed to “encourage their social activity, coor-
dinating their actions so that the benefits reach in 
the same manner all territories and each inhabitant 
of the nation” (14 p.605). To this purpose, the 
Mutual Associations Office was given the capacity 
to confer or remove legal personality to mutual 
associations, to keep a record and to audit them, 
among other things. 
d. “Section 38. – It is strictly prohibited to use 
expressions such as ‘Mutual Aid,’ ‘Mutuality,’ 
‘Mutual Protection,’ ‘Social Welfare’ or any other 
similar expression in the name of the organiza-
tions or companies which were not constituted in 
accordance with the provisions herein. The vio-
lation of this prohibition shall be penalized with 
fines up to ten thousand pesos of the national cu-
rrency and closure of any office that may infringe 
this provision (14 p.610). 
e. Formerly, drafts had been created that aimed at 
the regulation of the activities of mutual associa-
tions, but these were isolated attempts and were 
largely disregarded. All were introduced by so-
cialist legislators, such as Bunge in 1919.
f. “Collective contributions” are conventional 
clauses fixed by unions with union personality in 
order to establish a compulsory contribution from 
all workers in an employment sector, as payment 
for the improvements obtained during the negotia-
tions with the employers.
g. In 1966, a coup d’état known as the “Argentine 
Revolution” took place, headed by Juan Carlos 
Onganía, which removed from office the then 
democratically elected president Arturo Illia, 
member of the Radical Civil Union Party.
h. The legislative draft was signed by Consigli and 
Estrada (21 p.182).
i. This is an example of the first opposition on the 
part of the corporations of workers and doctors/
health professionals. It was introduced in De-
cember 1973, when the Executive Branch, headed 
by Cámpora, filed before the National Congress 
the so-called “Liotta draft,” named for its ideo-
logist, Domingo Liotta, the secretary of Public 
Health at that time. This draft had, according to 
Veronelli and Veronelli, the State-centered and 
universalist character suggested by the principlism 
of the already mentioned “Beveridge plan.” This 
proposal interfered with the interests of unions, 
on the one hand, as it would eliminate one major 
income source, and the interests of private me-
dical companies, the pharmaceutical industry and 
medical professionals, on the other hand, whose 
freedom to access the benefits of the health market 
would be put in danger. Thus, the original draft 
was modified in the National Congress itself. The 
wording regarding the obligatory adherence of the 
provinces and obras sociales to the public system 
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was removed, making such adherence instead op-
tional. Therefore, the law lacked operational effec-
tiveness. It seems reasonable, as Belmartino and 
Bioch (25) argue, that during the next two years 
drafts of this type acquired no public significance, 
given the importance that union leaders would 
regain during the new administration of Perón. 
j. The second opposition was initiated in 1980, 
when the military regime started to lose strength. 
After an initial policy of persecution and pro-
hibition of union activity (collective bargaining 
agreements was abrogated, union negotiations 
were eliminated, strikes were prohibited and nu-
merous unions were overhauled) and, above all, 
extermination of the worker bases, the military dic-
tatorship begins to conclude its strategy – once the 
possibility of “union accountability” to the worker 
bases was eliminated – through a new union re-
centralization. This was evidenced in the sanction, 
in 1979, of Act No. 22105 (27), which restored the 
Peronist union model, and in the reappearance of 
union leaders such as Lorenzo Miguel, who after 
being imprisoned in 1976, was reappointed as ge-
neral secretary of the UOM [an Argentinean trade 
union for the metallurgical industry workers] in 
January 1983. Once the bases of the new pattern 
of capital accumulation were established, the tra-
ditional, conciliatory Peronist unionism could be 
perfectly compatible with the “liberalization of the 
economy” (this was confirmed afterwards, in the 
1990s). However, the amendment of the Obras 
Sociales Act seems, in this respect, a contradiction. 
On July 30, 1980, Act No. 22269 (26) was passed, 
which created the “Entities of Obras Sociales” and 
implied the transference of union obras sociales 
to the hands of state mediators appointed by the 
INOS. Furthermore, it established the possibility of 
leaving such entities by demonstrating inscription 
in a prepaid health care company, which was the 
first legal precedent of the kind. This act, although 
pronounced, was never made effective. We con-
sider that, although this amendment fitted the as-
pirations of the military dictatorship regarding the 
state and the economy, its application was not 
possible due to the weakening of the government 
and the regrouping of unionism as a major actor in 
the political system.
k. Precisely, Antonio Mucci had to cede the po-
sition to Juan Manuel Casella and Carlos Alderete, 
who adopted the new conciliatory strategy. Aldo 
Neri, in turn, had to leave his position as Minister 
of Health in April 1986, once the new attempt 
of financial unification of the health system had 
failed.
l. The only exceptions have been the Obra Social 
for Workers of Commerce and Civil Activities 
[Obra Social de los Empleados de Comercio y Ac-
tividades Civiles] (OSECAC), which did make any 
agreement, and the Obra social for the Union of 
Civil Personnel of the Nation [Obra Social de la 
Unión Personal Civil de la Nación] (UP), which 
funded its own prepaid health care company using 
union funds (5 p.103).
m. The obras sociales that have obtained the 
greater number of transfers in their favor have 
been those that have agreements with the most re-
cognized private health care companies (5 p.103).
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES
1. Arce HE. El sistema de salud: de dónde viene 
y hacia dónde va. Buenos Aires: Prometeo; 2010.
2. Aren J. Régimen legal de las obras sociales 
agentes del Seguro Nacional de Salud. Buenos 
Aires: Lexis-Nexis; 2007.
3. Belmartino S. La atención médica argentina en 
el siglo XX: instituciones y procesos. Buenos Aires: 
Siglo Veintiuno Editores; 2005.
4. Clérico L, Ronconi L, Scioscioli S, Aldao M. 
Notas y preguntas sobre el “marco regulatorio de 
la medicina prepaga”. Jurisprudencia Argentina. 
2011;(8):3-35.
5. Fidalgo MM. Adiós al derecho a la salud. 
Buenos Aires: Espacio; 2008.
6. Maceira D. Financiamiento, aseguramiento y 
prestación de servicios de salud en Argentina [In-
ternet]. 2010 [cited 20 Feb 2013]. Available from: 
http://www.danielmaceira.com.ar/Maceira-IDRC 
-ArgSistemicoPPP-final-14julio2010%5B1%5D% 
5B1%5D.pdf. 
7. Tobar F. Herramientas para el análisis del 
sector salud [Internet]. 2000 [cited 20 Feb 2013]. 
Available from: http://www.saludcolectiva-unr.
com.ar/docs/SC-139.pdf. 
8. Veronelli JC, Veronelli-Correch M. Los orígenes 
institucionales de la salud pública en la Argentina. 
Buenos Aires: OPS; 2004.
314 DE FAZIO FL. 
SA
LU
D
 C
O
LE
C
TI
V
A
, B
ue
no
s 
A
ire
s,
 9
(3
):3
01
-3
15
, S
ep
te
m
be
r -
 D
ec
em
be
r, 
20
13
Universidad Nacional de Lanús | Salud Colectiva | ISSN 1669-2381 | ISSN 1851-8265
9. Zimmermann E. Los liberales reformistas: 
La cuestión social en la Argentina, 1890-1916. 
Buenos Aires: Sudamericana; 1995. 
10. Armus D. Consenso, conflicto y liderazgo 
en la lucha contra la tuberculosis. Buenos Aires 
1870-1950. In: Suriano J. La cuestión social en Ar-
gentina, 1870-1943. Buenos Aires: La Colmena; 
2000. 
11. Torre JC. La vieja guardia sindical y Perón: 
sobre los orígenes del peronismo. Buenos Aires: 
R y R; 2011. 
12. Murmis M, Portantiero JC. Estudios sobre los 
orígenes del peronismo. Buenos Aires: Siglo Vein-
tiuno Editores; 2011.
13. Argentina. Decreto-Ley 22212/45, Díctase el 
estatuto de los profesionales del arte de curar [In-
ternet]. 19 Sep 1945 [cited 21 Feb 2013]. Available 
from: http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/
anexos/190000-194999/194451/norma.htm.
14. Argentina. Decreto-Ley 24499/45. Anales de 
Legislación Argentina. 1945;V:605-611.
15. Anales de Legislación Argentina. 1945;V: 605-
611.
16. O´Donnell G. El Estado burocrático autori-
tario. Buenos Aires: Prometeo; 2010.
17. James D. Resistencia e integración: El pero-
nismo y la clase trabajadora argentina. Buenos 
Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores; 2010. 
18. Argentina. Ley 14455. Boletín Oficial de la Re-
pública Argentina. 1958;LXVI(18.747):1-3.
19. Argentina. Ley 18610, Obras Sociales. Boletín 
Oficial de la República Argentina. 1970;LXXVIII 
(21882):2-3.
20. Argentina. Decreto 2477/70. Boletín Oficial de 
la República Argentina. 1970;LXXVIII(21.941):5-7.
21. Anales de Legislación Argentina. 1970;XXX-
A:180-185. 
22. Argentina. Ley 20615, Asociaciones Profesio-
nales de Trabajadores. Boletín Oficial de la Repú-
blica Argentina. 1973;LXXXI(22.812):2-5.
23. Argentina. Ley 19710, Obras y Servicios So-
ciales. Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina. 
1972;LXXX(22.458):2-3.
24. Anales de Legislación Argentina. 1972;XXXII-
C:3357-3362.
25. Belmartino S, Bloch C. Políticas estatales 
y seguridad social en Argentina. Cuadernos 
Médico Sociales [Internet]. 1982 [cited 20 Feb 
2013];(22):1-16. Available from: http://www.ila-
zarte.com.ar/cuadernos/pdf/n22a074.pdf.
26. Argentina. Ley 22269, Obras Sociales. Boletín 
Oficial de la República Argentina. 1980;LXXXVIII 
(24484):2-6.
27. Argentina. Ley 22105, Ley de Asociaciones 
Gremiales de Trabajadores. Boletín Oficial de la 
República Argentina. 1979;LXXXVII(22269):2-5.
28. Persello AV. Historia del Radicalismo. Buenos 
Aires: Edhasa; 2007.
29. Argentina. Ley 23551, Asociaciones Sindi-
cales. Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina. 
1988;XCVI(26366):1-4.
30. Argentina. Ley 23660, Obras Sociales. Boletín 
Oficial de la República Argentina. 1989;XCVII 
(26555):1-3.
31. Basualdo V. Complicidad patronal-militar en la 
última dictadura argentina: Los casos de Acindar, As-
tarsa, Dálmine Siderca, Ford, Ledesma y Mercedes 
Benz. Presented at: IV Seminario Internacional Polí-
ticas de la Memoria “Ampliación del campo de los 
derechos humanos: Memoria y perspectivas”; 28-30 
Sep, 1 Oct 2011; Centro Cultural de la Memoria Ha-
roldo Conti, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
32. Murillo MV. La adaptación del sindicalismo 
argentino a las reformas de mercado en la primera 
presidencia de Menem. Desarrollo Económico. 
1997;147(37):419-446.
33. Argentina. Decreto 9/93, Obras Sociales. Bo-
letín Oficial de la República Argentina. 1993;CI 
(27557):3-4.
34. Argentina. Resolución 633/96, Obras So-
ciales. Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina. 
1996;CIV(28547):11.
35. Argentina. Ley 26682, Medicina Prepaga [In-
ternet]. 2011 [cited 20 Feb 2013]. Available from: 
http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/ 
180000-184999/182180/texact.htm.
36. Bauman Z. Vida de consumo. Buenos Aires: 
Fondo de Cultura Económica; 2007.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND WORKERS’ UNIONS AND ITS IMPACTS IN THE UNION-BASED HEALTH COVERAGE REGIME 315
SA
LU
D
 C
O
LEC
TIV
A
, Buenos A
ires, 9(3):301-315, Septem
ber - D
ecem
ber, 2013
Universidad Nacional de Lanús | Salud Colectiva | ISSN 1669-2381 | ISSN 1851-8265
ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anales de Legislación Argentina. 1944; Tomo I.
Belmartino S. ¿Estado social o Estado de com-
promiso?: agotamiento, crisis y reformulación de las 
instituciones de atención médica. Argentina 1920-
1945. In: Lvovich D, Suriano J, editores. Las políticas 
sociales en perspectiva histórica. Argentina, 1870-
1952. Buenos Aires: Prometeo; 2005.
Campos L. Estado y sindicatos: un análisis de sus 
relaciones a partir de los mecanismos de regu-
lación y conformación de la estructura sindical 
en Argentina (1943-1988). [Tesis de Maestría en 
Economía Política]. Buenos Aires: FLACSO; 2008.
Clérico L. La jurisprudencia de la Corte sobre me-
dicina prepaga en el contexto de un sistema de 
salud con fronteras “híbridas”. Buenos Aires: Juris-
prudencia Argentina; 2010.
Del Campo H. Sindicalismo y peronismo: los co-
mienzos de un vínculo perdurable. Buenos Aires: 
Siglo Veintiuno Editores; 2005.
Findling L, Ferrero JP. El escenario de la reforma 
de obras sociales: actores, estrategias y entre-
telones. Presented at: V Congreso Nacional de 
Ciencia Política; 14 al 17 de Noviembre de 2001; 
Río Cuarto, Argentina.
Palomino H. Elecciones en la UOM: un espejo de 
la normalización sindical. El Bimestre Político y 
Económico. 1986;4(19):2-6.
Ramaciotti K. La política sanitaria del peronismo. 
Buenos Aires: Biblos; 2009.
Rosanvallon P. La nueva cuestión social: repensar 
el Estado de Providencia. Buenos Aires: Ma-
nantial; 1995.
Suriano J. La cuestión social en Argentina, 1870-
1943. Buenos Aires: La Colmena; 2000.
Zapata F. Autonomía y subordinación en el sin-
dicalismo latinoamericano. México DF: Fondo de 
Cultura Económica; 1993.
Content is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution — You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not 
in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). 
Noncommercial — You may not use this work for commercial purposes.
The translation of this article is part of an interdepartmental collaboration between the Undergraduate Program in 
Sworn Translation Studies (English <> Spanish) and the Institute of Collective Health at the Universidad Nacional de 
Lanús. This article was translated by Marina Andrea Raimundo and Silvina Mariel Romero Soto, reviewed by Pamela 
Vietri and modified for publication by Vanessa Di Cecco.
CITATION
De Fazio FL. The relationship between the State and workers’ unions and its impacts in the union-based health cove-
rage regime in Argentina: an historical and political analysis. Salud Colectiva. 2013;9(3):301-315.
Received: 10 June 2013 | Accepted: 9 September 2013
